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IMPORTED INFLATION, GLOBAL PRICE CHANGES AND ECONOMIC CRISES
IN TANZANIA 1970-1982
Reginald Herbold Green with D.J.M. Kamori"'
In the present economic order we have two rights - to sell 
cheap and to buy dear
- President J.K. Nyerere
A world without growth and without rules is harder on poor 
countries than on the rich
- Commissioner Edgard Pisani
I. Introduction
Tanzania; A Structural Overview
Tanzania is a relatively large (900,000 square miles), moderate
population (20 million) low GDP ($200 per capita, national $4,000
million 1981) country. It is by UN definitions among the "least
developed" and "most severely affected". Over 19 61 — 1971 and 1971-1979
it achieved moderate rates of growth, about 4.556 per annum for real GDP
and 3.5Í for agricultural output (above the 2.75-356 population growth) -
a performance above the "least developed" and Sub-Saharan African
2averages but below its own goal of 656.
The economy was until 1973 structurally very open with exports plus 
imports exceeding 5056 of GDP. By 1981 the ratio had fallen to about 3556 
but more because of relative price changes and stagnation of exports 
than because of reduced external structural dependence. However, the 
makeup of imports had shifted over 19 61-81 from domination by final 
consumer good3 to about 50% capital goods, 3356 intermediate (of which 




Tanzania has no domestic oil 3curce. Electric power is basically hydro 
and household consumption basically wood. Historically it has usually 
been a net staple food (cereals) importer, albeit beverages (coffee, 
tea) and speciality foods (cashew, cardamon) dominate exports.
Inflation in Tanzania through 1979 paralleled global trends - 1979 price 
levels were 151 (to a 1975 base) versus the world average of 152 albeit 
the rate of increase over 1971-75 was higher and over 1976-79 lower.^
1980-82 has been marked by unprecedented (25-33$) annual cost of living 
increases^, inflation linked to import strangulation of production which 
has not merely reduced availability of goods but caused the government 
recurrent deficit by eroding the indirect tax base.
And a Political Economic Sketch
The public productive sector is dominant in large and medium scale
activity - except road transport and construction. Through
import/export, wholesaling, financial and agricultural marketing
dominance it has substantial leverage over retail trade and perhaps two
thirds of marketed peasant production which comprise two thirds of
exports and half of domestic food.^ Its performance has been uneven.
Finance and distribution performance is above average, manufacturing
mixed and agricultural production and marketing (except coffee) below
average. The sectoral total for public enterprise operating surpluses
peaked at about 6% of GDP in the early 1970s (and again in 1977) but
7then fell to near zero. The negligible net surplus sectorally is made 
up of cross cancelling enterprise surpluses and losses of about 4$ of 
GDP.
Domestic economic integration has been stressed, with substantial 
progress but major gaps in capital goods (except construction
g
materials), fuel and - in bad weather years - staple food." 3y
increasing the ratio of machinery and transport equipment to investment 
and GDP, the structural integration strategy has raised absolute import 
requirements and achieved only slow declines in the ratio of imports to
GDP.
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Reduction of inequality of income distribution and of access to basic 
services (health, education, water) have had sustained emphasis since 
1967 with substantial results.^ The ratio of the top 1$ to bottom 20$, 
of public sector employees pre-tax incomes was about 5 to 1 in 1980 - 
Literacy has been raised to 70-75$, access to water to over 50$ and life 
expectancy to 51 (from about 35 at Independence).
The basic planning approach has been a managed market one, via price 
incentives and disincentives together with a large public enterprise 
sector. Since 1971 foreign exchange and bank credit budgeting have also 
been central to economic management. Physical balance planning is very 
limited in coverage and compulsory production or delivery systems 
unknown. Fiscally Tanzania has traditionally followed a high tax, 
balanced recurrent budget policy. The first recurrent budget deficit, 
which came in 1 9 7 8-7 9 , was linked to the war with Uganda.
Until 198O there was no overall export strategy - positive or negative. 
Fragmentary product (e.g. tea) and sectoral (e.g. pre-export processing) 
strategies existed but received relatively low policy or resource 
priority.^
II. International Determinants: 1970-82 
Toward An Export Impasse
Exports are dominated by eight primary products - in descending order 
coffee, cotton, cloves, diamonds, sisal, cashew nuts, tea and tobacco 
plus sisal twine and cashew kernels. With the exception of cashew nuts 
and diamonds these products have been characterised by low global 
consumption growth and by real price patterns ranging from secular 
through moderate decline, to trendless radical instability. They account 
for 75-80$ of total exports, which in 1981 totalled about $500 million 
(a nominal record and a recovery to about 9 0$ of the 1966 volume peak). 
However, volume and value have since declined by about 3 0$."^
Manufactured goods exports - excluding residual oil - have been as high 
as 16$ of exports in 1979 but declined to under 10$ in 19 81 • In the
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case of processing (leather, cashew kernels, sisal twine), supply 
constraints at the imported spares/chemicals level, shortages of raw 
materials and - in the case of sisal twine - European cartel non tariff 
barriers were dominant. In other cases the devastating impact of import 
constraints on manufacturing affected several producers (e.g. tyres, 
batteries, aluminium circles) as did lack of foreign exchange or the 
availability of reciprocal tradeables from previous external purchasers 
(e.g. textiles).
The lack of a coherent export strategy to 1980—81 and the global (and 
consequent national) terms of trade shifts against several exports have 
led to a slow decline in export volume since the mid-1960s. Declines in 
both volume and receipts have been exacerbated by losses totalling 
perhaps $175 million in 19 81: about a quarter from faulty 1975-80
pricing (especially for cashews), another quarter from delays in payment 
for crops and a half from import constraints on fertiliser, pesticides, 
transport and processing equipment.
Imports: Price Explosion, Quantity Implosion
Superimposed on the 1961-81 trend toward dominance of capital and 
intermediate goods imports have been sharp price changes and a cereals 
import pattern related to taste changes (to wheat and rice), drought 
(1973-74, 1979-82) and inadequate storage (600,000 tonnes food loss over
1976-80 i.e. 2 years drought level imports).
Petroleum prices rose over tenfold during 1974-61 while quantity fell 
about 7$. Share in imports rose from 6% (netting out transit trade) to 
22%, Over 1973-76 however a massive increase in grain imports 
(paralleled by a trebling of unit cost) had a greater impact on external 
balance than did petroleum prices. This was not repeated in 1979-31. 
Import quantities were significantly lower and there was no grain price 
explosion so that 19 81 total food imports were nearly 1055 of all imports 
versus 3 .5 % in 1970 and 22% in 1974.12
No reliable terms of trade data exist. Because of transport cost and 
differential price increases - related to commercial arrears 
Tanzania's unit costs of manufactured imports have risen faster than
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global averages. Rough estimates based on partial data suggest 19 81
gross barter terms of trade were about 50 to a 1977 base or 55 to a 1972 
one ( 1 9 7 6 was about 65 to a 1972 base).1  ^ This means that at 1977 
relative prices, 19 81 exports would have covered over 100$ of actual 
imports as opposed to just over 50$ at 19 81 prices.
External Finance: Costs and Limits on Access
Tanzania has never had substantial access to normal commercial credit.
Over 1978-82 it used about $250 million of supplier export credits and
ran up $300-350 million commercial arrears (by 1982 including $50-75
million delayed government debt service) in attempts to sustain
investment and import levels respectively. External grants and soft (or
semi-soft, e.g. World Bank) loans have been a major source of foreign
exchange. In 1973 they were about Sh1,200 million (35$ of imports), in
1977 Shi,800 million (30$ of imports) and in 19 81 Sh3,500 million (37$
of imports). Divided by average import prices 1981 aid in real import
capacity terms was perhaps as high as 1973 or about 25$ lower on a real
14per capita basis. The 1981 total of grants, soft loans and import 
support was about $20 per capita.
Therefore, external finance could not cushion the 1973-82 fall in earned 
import capacity. Aid was stagnant in import capacity terms while 
indiscriminately used export credits and accumulation of arrears only 
postponed the import constraints’ impact on investment and production 
briefly, at a high cost in terms of still greater constriction in 19 81 
and 1 9 8 2.
III. National Macro-Economic Policies 
1970-721 A Prelude15
In 1970-72 Tanzania faced its first post-independence foreign exchange 
crisis. Gradual declines from late 1969 culminated in a massive fall in 
the second half of 1971. The causes were fairly readily identifiable: 
excess domestic credit formation (to enterprises), capital flight to
Kenya (following nationalisation of rented buildings), a shift in State 
Trading Corporation (STC) buying policy from 180 day external commercial 
credit to fob financed by domestic overdraft, and STC.stock control and 
ordering weaknesses.
The measures taken included detailed foreign exchange budgeting and 
allocation, commercial bank credit allocation (to major enterprises and 
the government), exchange control on transactions with Kenya and Uganda 
and a restructuring (decentralisation) of STC. By the end of the first 
quarter of 1972 reserves were on the rise and continued to climb 
reaching record levels in the final quarter of 1973.
Over the same period, concern with imported inflation - and especially 
its magnification in the distributive system - led to the creation of a 
prices management commission. Its approach was efficient production 
cost plus a proportion of assets or net worth combined with fairly tight 
restrictions on gross distributive margins. This strategy was 
moderately successful until 1978 but has since been largely swamped by 
the extreme scarcities and falling capacity utilisation ratios of 
1979-82.
The 1974-76 Emergency Programme^
In early 1974 the government realised that - despite high reserves - it 
faced a crisis from quadrupled oil prices and massive grain imports 
consequent on the 1973 and projected 1974 drought impact on harvests. 
The choices debated were a classic demand reduction approach and a 
'produce/invest out of trouble’ strategy calling for substantial 
bridging finance. The latter was adopted - largely because the 
political climate was favourable to it but partly because it was 
technically better presented (largely by the Ministry of Finance). The 
policy package adopted in the second quarter of 1974 included: near 
immediate adjustment of domestic prices to imported fuel, fertiliser and 
oil price rises and to 50$ grower price and 40$ minimum wage (tailing 
down to 6$ on upper salaries) increases; protecting real income of 
peasant food growers (via grower prices), minimum wage earners, drought 
hit areas (by * famine’ relief); sustaining enterprise surpluses (by 
price increases) and recurrent budget balance (by tax increases -
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including on petroleum products - and a 1974/75 freeze on recurrent 
expenditure). It also aimed at maintenance of real investment levels; 
consumption cuts; and production promotion centred on food (grower 
prices and input subsidies), consumer and intermediate goods 
manufacturing to reduce the ratio of imports to GDP and, in theory, 
export development. Other main measures taken included tightening 
foreign exchange and bank credit allocation and mobilising bridging 
finance (e.g. IMF - SDR’s, oil facility, first credit tranche) and
ipterim (e.g. bilateral grants, IBRD programme loan) to cover the
anticipated 1974-76 bulge in the trade deficit.
This policy was in a sense demand management via demand switching to 
protect low income groups and to maintain investment and basic services. 
Over 1974-76 the strategy was pursued - with distinct lags on the 
completion of projects in manufacturing and rather low attention to the 
export component. It was largely successful. After a poor 1974, growth
returned to over 5? a year, manufacturing returned to fairly rapid
expansion, record total and marketed crops were recorded, reserves rose. 
What was not fully noted was how heavily this depended on the 1976-77 
beverage price boom (which sent coffee to 20 year record real peaks) 
while, in volume terms, export stagnation/slow decline had not been 
reversed.
1977-78: The Typhoon’s Eye
With reserve levels climbing to five months imports at their late 1977
peak and the recurrent budget (which on normal accounting had remained
just in the black) returning to healthy surplus, a certain laxity in
respect to external and internal balance emerged; Foreign exchange
budgeting was greatly relaxed (including for non-essential consumer
17goods) under Bank/IMF pressure and bank credit formation controls fell 
into disuse. The overall rate of domestic credit formation expansion 
was low, masking a disquieting increase in respect to grain marketing, 
which in fact represented losses not inventories. The 1977-78 and
1978-79 recurrent budgets were optimistic, creative or lax depending on 
point of view.
With the collapse of the coffee boom and the rise in imports, reserves
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melted away in 1978 and the recurrent budget moved toward deficit. An
imminent crisis (the response to which was already delayed relative to
1974’s action time frame) exploded into an immediate one - and attention
was distracted from its resolution - by the war which followed Uganda’s
18invasion of Tanzania’s Kagera region in the last quarter of 1978. 
Tactical Sorties and Strategic Retreats: 1979-81
Over 1979-81 no effective adjustment strategy comparable in relevance, 
operationality or results to 1974-76 was achieved. Until mid-1979 the 
demands of the war prevented proper estimation of (or single minded 
attention to) the requirements of adjustment, while belief that the 1979 
poor harvest, 1979-80 oil price rise and the industrial economy 
stagnation would be reversed as quickly as 1973-74 problems, hid the 
true magnitude and urgency of the rapidly opening external gap. By the 
time a full scale attempt to reduce government expenditure was possible 
in late 1979, the recurrent budget deficit had exploded to 10$ of GDP 
and the revenue base (dominated by sales tax on domestic manufacturers) 
was being eroded by import constraints.
Compared to 1974 there were fewer consumer goods imports to cut so that 
reductions were delayed; they came after a buildup of suppliers credits 
and arrears had mortgaged the future and had rapid negative results on 
manufacturing, agriculture, transport and exports. Initial efforts to 
maintain investment (queried in 1980 and reversed in 1981) were both 
foredoomed and inappropriate given the length and depth of the terms of 
trade decline, the much lower starting level of real per capita aid (at 
least 35$ below 1973 in 1977) and the lack of low conditionality IMF 
facilities. Similarly while the real prices of food and selected export 
crops were raised, attempts to protect the real minimum wage in 1980 and 
1981 proved unsustainable given continued bad weather and the 40$
1978-81 fall in real manufactured goods production. Weaknesses (from 
deferred maintenance and total loss of physical and financial control by 
several agricultural marketing corporations) which had built up from 
1973 (and not been fully attended to in the 1977-78 period of relaxed 
resource constraints) were brutally exposed by the new pressures and 
diverted attention to desperate - and none too successful - patchworks. 
Tanzania’s adjustment proposals were not seen as credible by the IMF and
Bank leading to long delays in negotiation - which eroded the underlying 
position long enough to make the proposals obsolete - or to incomplete 
and fudged packages which had no chance of success (e.g. 1980 IMF
programme, especially given the failure of the Bank’s expected - and 
budgeted in the IMF projections - Structural Adjustment Programme Credit 
to materialise1^).
Thus by 1982 Tanzania - despite ruthless cutbacks which had won some
time in 1980 - faced a far more severe crisis than in either late 1974
or late 1979. While an export strategy had been agreed in principle in 
1980 and articulated to some purpose in 1 9 8 1, its production side was
severely handicapped by lack of foreign exchange to cover requisite
transport, raw material, spares, agricultural supplies and replacement 
inputs, while its payoff was also limited because of the impact of 
global recession on primary export prices and regional markets’ ability 
to pay for manufactured goods.
1982 - A Thing of Shreds and Patches
1982 saw rapid further retrenchment in real basic and defense recurrent 
expenditure, in wages and salaries (no increases in the face of 25-30$ 
cost of living increases), in real imports (which became an exercise in 
desperate juggling) and in new capacity creating investment - all of 
which continued through 1983- However, with declines in real import 
capacity and continued erosion of the revenue base and the financial 
position of export marketing and transport corporations, this merely 
averted instant collapse. Real GDP fell by about 2$ in 19 81 and 3$ in 
1982 (the first fall3 since Independence with the possible exception of 
1979)) and ability to plan ahead was sapped by the day to day demands of 
the very crises which made it essential.
External negotiations marked time - partly because Tanzanian
formulations remained relatively imperfect, partly because the
Structural Adjustment Programme produced by an independent Tanzania
P 0Advisory Group remained remarkably unarticulated (and remarkably 
inadequate at regaining budgetary balance), and partly because bilateral 
donors waited on the Bank and Fund (who were not in fact agreed on some
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•key issues). Equally basic, nobody (in Tanzania or elsewhere) could 
envisage a viable solution not involving substantial ($300-500 million a 
year for three years) added import capacity and medium term real export 
level increases, nor any practicable approach to achieving the first 
increase (or without it the second).
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IV. National Micro-Economic Policies
Fiscal Prudence and Frustration
Fiscal policy was conservative in intent. Recurrent budget breakeven in 
poor and surplus in good years was sought until 1980 (and until 1979/80 
was achieved) and a ceiling on bank borrowing for the capital budget (on 
balance, though not annually, achieved over 1972/78) was set. Taxation 
included relatively high and progressive income taxes which yielded 30$ 
of revenue in the early 1980s. As taxes in foreign trade declined (to 
10-15$ in early 1980s) sales tax in domestic manufactures became 
dominant (13-5% in 1972/73 and 35-40$ in early 1980s). This pattern 
worked well so long as manufacturing was not constrained by raw material 
and spares import strangulation. In 1974/76 substantial rate increases 
and modest quantitative growth made ex-post sales tax revenue buoyant. 
It proved disastrous over 1979/82, when the volume of manufactures fell 
by more than 40$, wiping out most of the nominal and more than all the 
real rate and price increases in sales tax revenue.
Total annual recurrent expenditure has been relatively constant at about
20$ of GDP since the end of the 1960s; it may have increased slightly in
1981/82 and 1982/83 when increases in parastatal reconstruction finance,
to repay past deficits initially covered by bank borrowing as well as
phasing out continuing losses, offset defense and basic cuts in 
21services . Capital expenditure rose fairly steadily from 7.5$ of GDP 
at the end of the 1960s to 15$ at the end of the 1970s but has since 
been cut to 10$ of GDP. Bank borrowing varied sharply as a share of 
financing requirement - 3 8$ 1969/70, 1$ 1972/73, 28$ 1975/76, negative 
in 1976/77, 19$ 1977/78 (all capital budget related) but rising to over 
40$ on a sustained basis from 1978/79.
Credit Budgeting and Fiscal Weakness
Bank credit allocations by major enterprise (or enterprise group) was 
begun in 1970/72 and intensified over 1974/76. It more or less lapsed 
over 1976/79 prior to severe reintroduction over 1979/82. It was based 
on estimates of output, cash flow and prices partly disaggregated to
* enterprise level; but it was relatively weak for agricultural marketing 
bodies because their borrowings were sharply influenced by harvest 
volumes which forced less precise limits and allowed passing off of 
losses as increases in stocks.
While government bank borrowing targets were not always held, they/
influenced actual spending; and until the war undershooting was almost 
as common as overshooting. Since then both the delay in bringing 
military spending and agricultural marketing losses down and the 
collapse of revenue have meant consistent overshooting of up to 50$.
Agricultural Policy - The Weaknesses of External Technocracy
Agricultural pricing and management was relatively weak until 1975 but
price coordination had maintained plausible relative prices. Over
1974/75 sharp increases were made in grain prices to protect peasant
incomes and provide incentives. Similarly, taking one year with
another, marketing authorities had net surpluses. Over 1975-81 price
setting, parastatal supervision and related areas were delegated to what
was de facto an autonomous, expatriate staffed parallel bureaucracy -
22the Marketing Development Bureau. The results were damaging in
respect to relative prices (which severely reduced cashew nut production
and led to unmanageable coarse grain and cassava surpluses). More
particularly, deterioration of marketing parastatal (except coffee)
performance included failure to pay on time, collapse of accounting
systems and in some cases of physical control and large, unknown
deficits ($200-250 million or 8$ of GDP in the staple food case). These
were exacerbated by the failure to achieve an inter-year storage policy
so that 600,000 tonnes of 1976-78 surpluses were spoilt, deteriorated
into poultry feed or dumped abroad and were thus unavailable to meet
1979-82 maize import demand. Relative prices were restored to some
semblance of order over 1980-82 for all officially marketed crops taken
together, but less so for exports relative to domestic food crops when
they stood above 1972/73 in real terms. But collapse in the terms of
trade and the overvaluation of the shilling resulting from rapid 1980-82 
23inflation left export crop production incentives far lower than 
optimal and created a Treasury subsidy burden of up to 15$ of recurrent
i
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revenue to cover marketing authority losses. Restoring order to
parastatal physical and financial systems and creating a workable
24storage system had barely begun by the end of 1982.
Incomes, Equity and The Shrinking Pie
Incomes policy centred on grower prices (raised about in line with the 
COL over 1974-82 but not uniformly for all crops), wages (which fell 
perhaps 40$ in real terms over 1973-82) and salaries (which fell by 
about two thirds in real terms over 1973-82). In 1969, 1972 and 1974 
minimum wage increases to offset cost of living increases were made 
while in the last year all wages and salaries were raised statutorily - 
tapering from 42$ at the bottom to 6$ at the top. A minor minimum wageA „
increase in 1975 was followed by a long gap to '1980 and 19 81 when there 
were 25$ increases (broadly offsetting those years1 COL rises) with a 
partial repeat of the 1974 exercise in 19 81 including 15-25$ wage and 
salary increases. In 1982 no increases were seen as practicable despite 
an anticipated 30$ plus COL increase.
The results of the incomes policy have included reduced intra urban and
25urban rural inequality. However, since 1978 this has been within an 
"all boats sink lower" context of allocating sacrifices to 'spare the 
weakest, not of dividing increases.
Price Management Under Pressure
Price management as noted earlier, has been on an "efficient operating 
cost plus" basis at major product and firm level. The Prices Commission 
has taken a highly sceptical view of asserted costs, especially in 
distribution, but have granted increases they believed adequate to 
sustain profits of efficient enterprises on an annual or semi annual 
basis. Over 1973-78 it did hold the inflation of domestic manufacturing 
and distribution costs below the average COL increase and did not result 
in massive ’parallel marketing’ or enterprise losses (the latter not 
entirely surprisingly as investible surplus was one of the targets the 
Price Commission was bound to seek to increase). Since 1979 cost push
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•inflation from falls in capacity utilisation and similarly caused 
physical shortages have radically reduced the Commission's ability to 
/ ascertain realistic cost projections (with resultant falls in enterprise 
surpluses), to hold down price increases or to avert widespread 
'parallel marketing'.
Fuel Pricing and Production
Fuel policy has involved petroleum pricing - taxation - allocation, 
alternative commercial fuel development and afforestation/woodlot 
programmes. Fuel prices (petroleum products and electricity) rose about 
360$ and petroleum products alone about 425$ from 1972 to mid-1981 
compared to about 300$ for the overall cost of living. From late 19 81 
on premium gasoline prices have exceed $1 per litre with gas oil and 
kerosene at $0.40 to 0.45.
All direct import cost increases were passed on to users. There were at 
no point any fuel subsidies and both the petroleum refining/distributing
1
companies and the national electric power company showed rising pre-tax 
profits in real as well as nominal terms through 1981 despite a volume 
decline in the case of petroleum products.
Similarly, government surplus from petroleum (here defined as taxation
’on products plus the profits of the state importing/wholesaling firm
substituted for the majors in 1976) rose by 350$ (slightly above the COL
index) although it declined somewhat as a share of final price and fell
from about 75$ of petroleum import cost in 1972 to under 45$ in 19 81.
Within this total taxes, (the only source in 1972) fell to less than
TPDC's pre-tax profits or from 75$ to 20$ of import cost and declined in 
27real terms. Petroleum pricing policy was designed to: avoid
subsidisation and enterprise losses; ensure an adequate TPDC cash flow; 
and limit increases in the cost of rural transport and of low income 
group lighting.
As a result tax increases were limited after 1974 and the relative 
prices of kerosene and gasoil were lowered (i.e. they rose less) 
compared to gasoline.
‘From 1981 physical allocation by region and to key users was instituted 
with rather uneven but fairly visible effect. Gasoline rationing in Dar 
es Salaam - while possibly useful as a demonstrable burden imposed on 
the elite like the 1974 limitation on Sunday driving - had limited 
impact on volume or distribution of users. By late 1983 petrol and gas 
oil shortages were endemic especially in the Lake regions.
Hydroelectric capacity was increased substantially over 1972-81 allowing 
elimination of thermal plant on the national grid. In 1980 extension of 
the grid was begun (with a tentative 1986 completion date) to allow 
substitution for thermal plant at the main southern and lake towns. 
Exploration for oil from 1969 on has yet to discover any although major 
programmes are in hand. It has discovered gas which should by the late 
1980s add 40$ to 1982 export value through manufacture of urea and 
ammonia. Coal development has to date made little progress and - except 
for small or isolated processing plants - is probably less economic than 
hydro or gas development.
The dominant fuel household use and tobacco curing fuel is wood. There 
is little tradeoff with oil but an urgent need to develop more secure 
and accessible supplies, to reduce the inordinate share of women’s and 
girls’ time spent ’’wooding", to halt desertification in certain 
districts and to avert the collapse of the rapaciously wood intensive 
tobacco sector. Since the mid-1970s the forestry division has - 
apparently with increasing success - placed major emphasis on tree 
planting both for ecological purposes and (especially in the case ofpO
village woodlots) for direct household fuel supply. However,
replanting is still not. equivalent to cutting particularly in tobacco 
growing areas and near major cities.
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VV. Impact of International and Policy Changes 
Price Changes: Importation and Accommodation
Until mid-1979 price changes were largely in response to global price 
changes both in extent and timing. Because Tanzanian imports were 
intensive in grain at the time its price exploded and petroleum use 
could not readily be compressed except by multiplied output reductions, 
the overall increase was slightly more rapid than average and more 
concentrated in 1974-75.
, Domestic policy was relatively accommodationist - i.e. real grower 
prices and real minimum wages were substantially, though not fully in 
the latter case or uniformly in the former, protected. However, in 
respect to manufactured goods, distributive margins, public utilities 
and salaries price increases were deliberately held below the average 
COL or import price increase.
Since 1979 the impact has been different. The initial inflationary 
impact came from war costs - recurrent budget deficits and disruption of 
transport. Its continuation relates to the cumulative impact of 
importing industrial recession as cost push (and revenue base erosion) 
inflation. A 50$ fall in the terms of trade over 1977-82 led to a 
40-45$ 1977-81 decline in earned import capacity, despite a (small)
export volume increase. There was a further 3 0$ fall in 1982 as 
transport, processing and input bottlenecks more than wiped out export 
production promotion efforts.
Balance of Payments - A Receding Historic Memory
Over 1974-77 balance of" payments management- was responsive to and able 
to manage very large swings in the trade deficit. In part this related 
to their being substantially reversed (in real terms) by 1977. An 
additional factor was the 1974-75 availability of substantial IMF low 
conditionality resources to bridge the gap before other aid commitments 
(in practice basically offsetting the rapid decline in Chinese
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transfers) became effective. But equally critical was the possibility 
of cutting consumer goods and maintenance imports sharply with little 
immediate impact on production.
1978 per contra was a rake’s progress. Imports (especially of consumer 
goods) were substantially liberalised in 1977 precisely as the terms of 
trade turned sour. An imprudently high projected use of reserves was 
exceeded and corrective action delayed. The war with Uganda thus caught 
Tanzania with a precarious and rapidly deteriorating reserve position.^
Over 1979-82 the combined impact of external shocks - war, sluggish and 
relatively tightly tied real resource transfers, drought and falling 
terms of trade - would have made balance of payments management very 
difficult even under 1973 conditions. In faofc the starting point was 
much worse: neither owned reserves nor low conditionality IMF facilities 
were available to buy time. The deferred maintenance backlog, which had 
only partially been cleared, made spares and related imports cuts much 
more damaging to production. There were few consumer goods left to cut. 
The unselective use of supplier credit in 1979-81, to sustain investment 
related imports for low priority projects, heavily mortgaged 19 81 and 
subsequent export earnings. By late 1 9 8 2, to speak of a balance of 
payments was a misnomer and foreign exchange allocation in practice was 
collapsing into ad hoc juggling to cover particular shipments on a day 
to day basis.
Exchange Rate Adjustment: From Responsiveness to Deadlock
Tanzania has not viewed the exchange rate as a major positive tool for 
causing desired results. Until 1979, however, it viewed exchange rate 
changes (several small devaluations and one mini revaluation) as a 
necessary minor part of adjusting to changed global price relationships
(e.g. to avoid absolute decreases in grower prices).
From 1979 on a proto-policy of small, frequent adjustments (25$ in 5 
half yearly changes was canvassed in 1979 and 40$ in 5 or 6 in
1981-82)^ was blocked by two factors. First, it was argued that it
would complicate inflation control and - perhaps - protection of low 
income groups. Second, and more critical, it collided head on with IMF
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advice for ’jumbo’ devaluations (25-30$ canvassed in 1979 and 60-70$ in
1981-82) which made the mini-adjustment strategy seem useless in gaining 
an agreed IMF programme and aroused an equally fundamentalist response 
on the part of some Tanzanian leaders of opposing any devaluation at 
all.
As a result the only exchange rate change from mid-1979 through the end 
of 1982 was a 13$ adjustment (devaluation) in March 1982 which really 
only corrected the 1980—81 accidental revaluation flowing from a dollar 
dominated currency basket adopted in 1979 (and not changed until 1982). 
Even that was delayed nine months because of the domestic reaction to 
the IMF's stance which led to a deadlock on negotiating a programme 
throughout 1981 and 1982. Over 1982-83 the increase in overvaluation’s 
impact on the Budget (via subsidies to export o-rop authorities) and the 
need to achieve a credible position for negotiating with sources of 
external finance, resulted in an increasingly firm and clear commitment 
to phased devaluation beginning with 20$ in June 1983-
If one accepts the World Bank’s view that there was limited
31overvaluation in 1980 - and by implication very little in 1979 - then
one arrives at a plausible range of rates for mid 19 83 of 16 to 22 
shillings to the dollar versus an actual of 12.4. It is believed that 
Tanzanian strategy is to move by several steps to a point within this 
range by the end of 1984, and to adjust in small steps subsequently on 
the basis of relative inflation rates.
Economic Growth: Recovery and Collapse
The initial impact of the 1974 Emergency Programme - and more
importantly of the 1973-74 drought - was to cause GDP growth to decline
to about 2$ (and agricultural output to fall 2$) in 1974. Thereafter,
growth rapidly recovered to almost 6$ in 1977 (with agricultural growth
over the 1975-78 period also averaging about 6$). GDP stagnated or fell
in 1979 > recovered in 19 8 0, and fell throughout 1981-83* Real
agricultural output declined from 1980 onward. This was largely weather




The pattern is fairly typical of sub-Saharan African economies - a 
manageable crisis in 1974-75 and a larger, unmanageable one beginning in 
1979» The onset of the crisis (and the 1980 declines in manufacturing 
output and in crop production) are explicable in terms of unwise use of 
reserves in 1978, war in 1978-79 and drought from 1979* Its 
continuation and unmanageability stem primarily from sustained 
importation of industrial economy recession, which prevented growth of 
exports and therefore import capacity. By 1983/84 the situation had 
deteriorated so badly that OECD recovery, even if including a beverage 
price boom, could no longer be expected to turn the situation around. 
Outside agriculture (and in part even there) the basic problem was not 
one of available capacity, nor even of technical and managerial 
personnel to utilise it, but of the 20-25$ direct import component 
needed to operate and maintain it. \r-
Development Pattern Impact - Adjustment or Distortion?
Because 1974-76 was seen as a stochastic shock - albeit with some
permanent price shifts in favour of oil, grain and manufactures - its
impact was to reinforce rather than reverse sectoral priorities.
33Integration of the industrial sector and self- sufficiency in grain 
were seen as demonstrably correct - as was increased emphasis on 
hydrocarbon exploration. While, in principle, more emphasis was to be 
placed on export expansion (especially by pre-export processing and 
buildup of selected manufactured goods sales in regional markets) this 
was de facto largely deferred over 1974-76 and lost sight of over 
1977-78, when the external account position seemed less worrisome and 
there was a relaxation from tight macro management of 1974-76. 
Substantial export processing capacity was created but inadequately 
supplied, managed and marketed.
The 1979-82 crisis appears to be having a more complex result. This is 
partly because it is perceived as semi-permanent and partly because 
(short of finding liquid hydrocarbons) no set of sectoral balance 
changes appears both practicable and adequate.
Increased relative resource allocations have been made to agriculture 
and supporting services, the only sector to ^how a volume increase in
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imports over 1979/80-1982/83, and to projects/inputs directly relevant 
to boosting exports and/or saving actual current imports. However, 
reallocation is crippled by rapidly falling total import capacity - a 
higher share of a shrinking cake has often meant an absolute decline. 
In respect of energy (hydroelectric generation and transmission, 
hydrocarbon exploration and gas based export development) and part of 
forestry (pulp and paper mill, wood supply) the reallocation of imports 
to date appears just adequate to allow progress toward higher production 
and exports. Elsewhere it seems to have crippled industry, health, 
water and education without being adequate to restore agricultural or 
primary export growth.
Morale, Morality, Political Viability
Morale was shaken in 1975 but the 1974 programme was broadly accepted as 
a bold and necessary response to external crisis, and as equitable in 
allocation of burdens. Over 1976-78 morale recovered sharply as success 
became apparent (admittedly apparent not real in 1978). Over 1979 it 
was sustained because the liberation of Uganda produced a temporary 
euphoria. Recollection of 1974-76 sustained morale in 1980 but it has 
manifestly deteriorated as the record of unsuccess has lengthened. 
There is for the first time substantial doubt as to the government’s 
ability to cope, hardly surprising with national command over resources 
per capita one third down on 1978.
Morality also suffered over 1975-76, partially recovered over 1977-78 
and has worsened radically over 1979-82. However, this is in relative 
terms and a particular context. Very few major decisions or contracts 
are influenced by bribery. Both private and public corruption and 
profiteering are both rhetorically and actually seen as evil and as 
exceptions; they are attacked to some effect, albeit somewhat 
frenetically and episodically. ’’Parallel marketing’’ is tolerated where 
need based (e.g. the peasant paddy crop and minor overcharges at retail) 
but deeply hated in cases of full scale ’entrepreneurs of adversity’. 
The pressure that the upward trend of scarcities and the downward trend 
of wage, salary and small business real incomes put on future evolution 




Tanzania’s Government still seems to have a broad base of support (in 
the sense of popular acceptance of its objectives). This is consistent 
with a decline in morale for two reasons. First no potential 
alternative ruling coalition exists. There are vocal pro-capitalist 
left-wing critics but they lack the necessary institutional and 
sub-class bases to be credible alternatives. Second, the experience of 
Tanzania’s neighbours with widely varied capitalist strategies - and in 
Mozambique a socialist strategy distinctly less pro-rural and open than
Tanzania’s - strongly suggests to the leadership and to many workers,
peasants and even officials and managers that domestic strategy mistakes 
cannot be the basic cause of the crisis.
This similarity in basic problems, given the disparity in political
economic strategies and division of costs, suggests to many Tanzanians 
that the basic causes of the economic crises are indeed external and 
therefore not in themselves strong reasons for querying official goals 
and strategies or even seeking a wholesale change in leadership (of 
which there has been a fairly high turnover through normal elections and 
appointment procedures). Predicting the effect of the continuing crisis 
in this respect is risky. Acceptance of sincerity without success is 
presumably not infinite - Tanzanians expect results from the state. On 
the other hand unless a credible alternative strategy and political
coalition emerge criticism is likely - as at present - to be of failures 
and alterations of degree and emphasis within, rather than alternatives 
to, the present political economic paradigm of the state and Party.
VI. Outlook and General Reflections
Through a Glass Grimly
It is extremely difficult to make any reasoned projections for the 
Tanzanian economy. Any which offer a prospect of stabilisation and 
recovery require one or more highly optimistic assumptions about import 
capacity. Any which take present (and reasonably projectable) earned 
import capacity and resource transfers point to continued decline. At 
some not terribly distant point this would result in a collapse intoi
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Ghanaian or Zairois conditions which are not really comparable to - or 
analysable in the same terms and categories of - normally (even if 
badly functioning) economies.
Prospects for existing exports are bleak Quota limits in the case of/
coffee, and demand and cartel imits in the case of sisal and twine, 
preclude major gains in earned import capacity. Tobacco faces a fuel 
threat to viability and poor price prospects. Cotton also faces 
ecological barriers to even sustained output as do cloves. The diamond 
mine is nearing exhaustion. Rebuilding cashew picking/collection (and 
in the medium term replanting) requires uncertain quantities of time, of 
disease control and of transport rehabilitation; restoring real price 
levels to growers has at best stemmed further declines. No major terms 
of trade recovery can be expected. Greater^efficiency in allocation 
of resources to support export production and marketing and to clear 
bottlenecks might raise earned import capacity 2-4$ a year over 1983-90 
(barely offsetting the rise in debt service).
New exports in sight for the late 1980s - paper and ammonia/urea - 
should raise total exports by 30-45$ but over their first decade will 
have very substantial capital repayment obligations. They might allow a 
modest import growth were present levels adequate (as opposed to 20-30$ 
below minimum for efficient operation), arrears negligible (vs $500 
million) and the export cover of imports 75$ (vs 50$). As it is they 
are a necessary part of any answer, but far from the whole of it.
Major aid increases are ■unlikely - partly because overall ODA in real 
terms simply will not grow rapidly over 1983-90. Reallocation of 75$ 
(versus about 30$ now) of ODA to maintenance and capacity utilisation 
support might provide a basis for stabilisation, by allowing import 
shifts to spares and intermediate goods, with recovery in the late 1980s 
as the new exports came on stream.
However, such transfers seem dependent on a Tanzania/IMF Agreement (also 
necessary if arrears are to be reduced this side of 1990). The main 
obstacle is the Tanzania government's belief (backed by at least two 
independent analyses) that a 60-70$ one off devaluation and 50$ interest 
rates - as proposed by the IMF - would catapult inflation from the 25$
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to 30$ range to over 100$, make subsequent reduction almost impossible
and greatly weaken economic management capability by diversion of
attention and increase in uncertainty. Per contra Fund Missions have 
viewed Tanzania's approach of gradual devaluation as not worth 
negotiating about. As a result neither approach is acted on and others 
delay their decisisons while real economic decline and capacity erosion 
continue. Had no proposals for maxi devaluations been made by the
IMF, the actual exchange rate would probably have depreciated by more 
than it did in 1981, 1982 and 1983.
Tanzania in Perspective - Some Tentative Generalisations
The impact of imported inflation on Third World and fringe industrial 
economies over 1970-82 has varied significantly as have the constraints 
on their responses. To generalise from Tanzania to the Republic of 
Korea or to Kuwait would be otiose. However, several elements of 
Tanzania’s experience do seem relevant to the low income, economically 
small countries with exports dominated by primary products and lacking 
assured domestic fuel and/or basic food supplies - e.g. Malawi and Sri 
Lanka within this study and to a majority of Sub-Saharan African and 
Least Developed economies.
These economies exhibit a variant of the Giffen (inferior) good paradox. 
When the real prices of their exports decline they are unable to switch 
resources to alternative exports. Beyond a finite point they cannot 
reduce real imports without economic collapse. As a result they are 
virtually forced to ignore market price signals and normal allocational 
efficiency criteria and seek to raise exports of precisely those 
products for which the world market prices signal relatively less 
production. If a significant number of countries succeed in raising
physical exports, the ensuing acceleration of real price erosion 
actually reduces their collective real export earnings and those of most 
individual countries. This certainly has been the 1976-81 record in 
coffee, with value stabilisation and recovery achieved in 1982-83 
because ICA quotas reduced exports.
Industrial economy deflation can be - and is - imported as cost/push and 
’parallel market’ inflation. This is true because industrial economy
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deflation and stagnation results in low growth of global trade in 
primary products and in worsening terms of trade. Resulting declines in 
real import capacity force cuts in capacity utilisation, infrastructure 
maintenance (e.g. transport, water, power) and in agricultural sector 
inputs (e.g. fertiliser, pesticides, implements). All tend to raise 
unit costs (often dramatically) and to create acute physical shortages, 
making profiteering and ’parallel marketing’ (whether technically 
illegal or not) inevitable. In the case of Tanzania, imported inflation 
resulting from the export of depression by industrial economies over
1979-82 has apparently (if not readily quantifiably) been more sustained 
and intense than imported inflation of the more standard type over 
1973-75, partly because the period of importing depression has been 
substantially longer.
V
At present, use of short term commercial credit (including unselective 
acceptance of supplier/export credit and commercial arrears), especially 
at high interest rates, is analogous - for these economies - to the use 
of heroin to cure depression, a quick fix at the price of worsening the 
underlying problem. While bolstering import capacity for two or three 
years, it reduces medium term import capacity unless: terms of trade 
recover, sustained rapid quantitative growth of exports despite
declining real unit value is possible or commercial short term borrowing 
can not only be rolled over but rolled up to cover repayment of 
principal and interest and a steadily rising net inflow. None of these 
is very plausible and when the merry-go-round stops the impasse is worse 
than if the import cuts had been made sooner.
Structural changes toward greater national economic integration produces 
paradoxical results unless real earned import capacity can, at the
least, be sustained. The initial impact of such change is to increase 
import requirements absolutely (e.g. in plant and machinery) and to
shift them from final consumer to intermediate and capital goods. If 
successful in raising output and increasing intersectoral linkages (as 
Tanzanian industrial policy was through 1978) this too raises absolute 
import requirements because the volume growth more than offsets the
decline in import content per unit for many years. If a prolonged fall 
in real export earnings comes while such a process of structural change 
is in its early stages the results are traumatic. Very few imports can
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be sacrificed without an impact on domestic production - a situation 
unlike that of a pure ’plantation’ economy basically importing final 
consumer goods. But because of remaining production gaps it is not 
possible, in general, to reallocate domestic resources to substitute for 
intermediate goods imports. The resultant cost of import cuts is a 
multiplier negative impact on domestic value added (over 3 in Tanzanian 
manufacturing) and on domestic goods availability (up to 10 at retail 
prices in respect to manufactured goods in Tanzania i.e. 3 value added 
in manufacturing, 2 to 6 indirect and profits tax, 2 to 3 in transport 
and distribution costs and margins). The impact is thus more acute in 
respect both to output and inflation if substantial, but incomplete, 
initial steps toward national integration have been taken prior to an 
import capacity collapse than for either a flexible industrial or semi 
industrial economy or a pure ’plantation’ economy. A substantially 
integrated economy has some immunity to tr'áde shocks while in a 
’plantation’ economy there is no multiplier impact of import cuts on 
domestic production.
External imbalance gap closing by standard methods appears impracticable 
within the national structure constraints and the present world economic 
outlook. The crisis has undermined the possibility of export growth 
(e.g. Malawi), resulted in massive growth in output and investment being 
paralleled by real per capita consumption falls as well as worsening 
external gap3 and inflation (e.g. Sri Lanka)^ and/or blocked
continuation of systematic reduction of import dependence (e.g.
37Tanzania). The World Bank prescription of temporary reversion toward 
a ’plantation economy’ (i.e. primary export growth led recovery) and 
sharp increases in real concessionary transfers appears technically and 
politically unattainable (quite apart from any judgement on itsoO
desirability). The UNCTAD Integrated Commodities Programme
increasingly appears to be neither integrated, an operational programme 
nor of much use to commodity producers or commodity export dependent 
economies.
Domestic inefficiency compounds the impact of external shocks but is 
also a nearly inevitable consequence of such shocks. Both markets and 
analytically based allocation management work less well under conditions 
of rapid change and substantial uncertainty. The sudden escalation of
i
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day to day crisis management requirements reduces - for the private 
enterprise and peasant as well as for the public sector - the ability 
not simply to undertake medium term strategic planning but even to stand 
back to see what immediate allocational and semi-structural changes 
would increase the efficiency with which existing (reduced) resources 
were applied.^ There is a built in tendency to seek to do a little 
less of everything in about the same way, no matter how inappropriate 
(vide Malawian plantation concentration, Sri Lankan fixation with large 
scale capital and energy intensive water works, Tanzania’s 1970-81 
deferral of developing an export strategy to sustain - as opposed to an 
import control strategy to reduce - basic import requirements).
Domestic political constraints vary widely but are never absent. In 
Tanzania, policies overtly causing major reductions in minimum wages and 
real peasant incomes cannot be adopted by the present leadership because 




1. Professor Green has served frequently as advisor to Tanzania since 
1964 while Mr. Kamari is Director of Economic Research and Policy 
at the Bank of Tanzania. Both wish to stress that the analysis and 
conclusions of this study are their personal responsibility and are 
not necessarily those of the Tanzanian authorities and that 
Professor Green alone prepared and is responsible for the final 
text.
2. Basic data can be found in the Statistical Annexes to World Bank 
1981, 1982, 1983 and in Tanzania Economic Surveys.
1
3. Adapted from Bank of Tanzania Annual Reports supplemented by Trade 
Statistics detailed printouts.
4. See table , in introduction to this volume for global data,
Bank of Tanzania Annual Reports for Tanzania.
5. The Tanzania National COL Index is computed from prices of sample 
purchases of items in the index (not officially set prices). This 
method would slightly overstate prices, in comparison to those paid 
by a real shopper using his own money, but the relative 
underweighting of rural areas would have the reverse impact. The 
IMF - on no stated reasoning - asserts the COL Index understates 
price increases ILO, 1982 after detailed examination suggested that 
it overstated.
6. Agricultural quantity data are weak. The estimates for marketed 
share of food are based on a formula assuming 5$ - vs 13-15$ actual 
- urban population and no rural food sales. About 35$ of 
households have basically non-agricultural incomes and on balance 
use somewhat higher proportions of high value foods while peasants 
do, in fact, buy some food. A 50-50 division between subsistence 
(household self provisioning) and marketed food is a plausible 
working hypothesis.
7. Unpublished national accounts working data and unofficial estimates 
from Treasury enterprise data. See also Economic Surveys.
8. See Bienefeld, Coulson, Green in Fransman, 19 81.
9. See ILO, 1982 and 1977.
10. See Green, Rwegesira, Van Arkadie, 19 81 for a fuller explanation of 
the reasons for this strategic gap.
11. Preliminary 1982 and first half of 1983 data from Bank of Tanzania.
12. Economic Survey data supplemented by Bank of Tanzania detailed 
foreign exchange allocation and use records.
13. A new national series is being constructed by the Bank of Tanzania.
The 35$ 1972-76 fall is an UNCTAD estimate. The 50$ 1977-81 fall
4is a semi-official Treasury one based on rough estimation from 
actual prices received and paid for main products traded. It 
corresponds roughly to Uganda estimates. The much lower falls 
shown by World Bank and UNCTAD series are based on industrial 
economy import and export prices used as proxies but these seem to 
understate how rapidly prices actually paid by Tanzania have risen 
and overstate actual growth of unit receipts on exports.
14. Most 1973 aid was from China so that OECD aid shows a much more 
positive trend.
15. For a fuller account and detailed sources, see Green, Rwegasira, 
Van Arkadie, op. cit..
16. Ibid.
17. See Payer, 1983. Why Tanzania agreed is less clear a3 it was not
then using either an IMF facility or a Bank programme loan.
18. See Green, Rwegasira, Van Arkadie, op.cit/.'
19. See 1981 Budget Speech of Minister for Finance.
20. Based on Interim Report of TAG and 1982 Tanzania Structural 
Adjustment Programme "Bluebook" and implementation checklist.
21. Data from Bank of Tanzania, 20 Year Economic Survey 1961-81, in 
press.
22. For a fuller account see Payer 198 3. There was very little 
political pressure on MDB as to specific prices - indeed almost all 
of its proposals were rubberstamped until 19 81 and the changes then 
were to higher average consumer prices for grain and producer 
prices for cashew nuts.
23. From 1980 on Tanzania's inflation rate (in COL terms) has been 
above the African average or that for developing countries as a
whole albeit far from being in the top tier in either context.
24. Over 1980-82 a step by step clawback of power from MDB took place 
culminating in a new Minister and a Tanzanian Agricultural Policy 
Study forming the basis for the 1983 Agricultural Policy Statement.
25. See ILO, 1977 and 1982 for detailed review and analysis of data.
26. Largely based on TPDC Annual Reports and unpublished Ministry of 
Water and Energy and Sales Tax revenue breakdown data.
27. This was partially reversed over 1 9 8 2 - 8 3 especially for premium 
gasoline, for both to raise revenue and to deter consumption.
28. Largely from unpublished national energy survey materials and 
scattered Forestry Division reports.
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29. See Green, Rwegasira, Van Arkadie, op. eit.
30. See Green in Williamson 1983»
31. Bank, 1983, p. 62.
32. 1982 and 1983 Budget Speeches, Economic Surveys.
33. See Bienefeld and Green in Fransman, 19 81.
34. See Bank, 1983, pp. 7-13, 30.
35. A result which Williamson points out (Williamson, 19 8 3, p. 652) 
reflects little credit on the Fund, the Bank or Tanzania.
36. See World Bank, 1982, p. 28.
37. World Bank, 1981.
v
3 8 . See Amoaka and Please 1983 for a partial admission of this with 
respect to rapid increases in earnings from primary product 
exports.
39. E.g. in Tanzania rough calculations of ratios of import allocations 
to metres of cloth produced, for sub-sectors within textiles shows 
a tendency to allocate in favour of firms with low ratios (mostly 
in the private sector). Further analysis by the Ministry of 
Industries has identified and corrected several more cases. In the 
absence of crisis management, this analysis would probably have 
become routinised much earlier.
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